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Abstract
We describe here some of the developing conversations between “third phase” cognitive science 
and phenomenological philosophy. Contributors to these conversations treat cognition as 
an embodied, active, and situated phenomenon. We argue that, despite much promise, proper 
engagement with the foundational phenomenological concept of a situated, meaning-making 
person has yet to be fully reflected in these conversations. We note that the outcomes of this 
dialogue have important implications for the field of phenomenological psychology. In particular, 
we demonstrate that one qualitative method, interpretative phenomenological analysis, can make 
a useful contribution to the ongoing developments in this field. We suggest that it can provide a 
valuable hermeneutic counterpoint to the primacy of empiricist methods. Through reference to 
sustained examples from research participants’ accounts of chronic pain, we show how qualitative 
phenomenological approaches, such as interpretative phenomenological analysis, can illuminate the 
importance of situating embodied personal experience in the context of meaning, relationships, 
and the lived world.
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This paper deals with the confluence occurring between various philosophical and 
scientific streams of thought in the area of phenomenology and cognition. Van Gelder 
(1999) has argued that an ethos of mutuality and pluralism will best nurture develop-
ments here, and it is in this spirit that we offer the argument that at least one potentially 
important tributary has been left off the map.
We begin with an outline of the converging approaches and argue that proper engage-
ment with the foundational concept of a situated, meaning-making person has yet to be 
fully reflected in the field of embodied active situated cognition (EASC). We argue fur-
ther that methods from phenomenological psychology (notably, interpretative phenom-
enological analysis) can make a useful contribution to the development of EASC. As the 
paper develops, and particularly in the final section, we discuss some examples (drawing 
on first-person interview extracts) from a series of studies carried out by the third author, 
which explore the experience of chronic lower back pain (Osborn & Smith, 1998, 2006; 
J.A. Smith & Osborn, 2007). 
Pain is an especially good example because the apparent primacy of its embodied 
nature is nevertheless inextricable from social and cultural context (e.g., Derbyshire, 
2004; Showalter, 1997). That is, pain is situated. For qualitative psychologists, “situ-
ated” carries the connotation of situated “in meaning,” as much as it does “in personal 
and social relationships,” and “in a physical world of objects.”
Embodied, [en]active, situated cognition
The emergence of a “third phase” in the so-called “cognitive revolution” has now been 
well documented (see, e.g., Roy, Petitot, Pachoud, & Varela, 1999). This newest mani-
festation of cognitive science has been most frequently described as “embodied,” and/or 
“situated”—but also as “enacted” and “ecological.” There are subtle distinctions implied 
by these different emphases, but as Anderson (2003) points out, these differences tend to 
have least impact at the level of psychosocial analyses. As this is the level of our interest 
here, we treat these new approaches as developing aspects of one “movement,” in accord-
ance with their many commonalities. We refer to this movement as embodied active situ-
ated cognition (EASC):
Instead of emphasizing formal operations on abstract symbols, this new approach focuses 
attention on the fact that most real-world thinking occurs in very particular (and often very 
complex) environments, is employed for very practical ends, and exploits the possibility of 
interaction with and manipulation of external props. It thereby foregrounds the fact that 
cognition is a highly embodied or situated activity—emphasis intentionally on all three—and 
suggests that thinking beings ought therefore to be considered first and foremost as acting 
beings. (Anderson, 2003, p. 91)
As Anderson implies here, EASC represents a distinct development from the preceding 
(and prevailing) phases of “computational-symbolic” and “connectionist-dynamic” cog-
nitive science, inasmuch as it begins from very different philosophical assumptions 
about what “cognition” is. Here cognition is not something which takes places solely or 
exclusively “in the head” (see, e.g., Gallagher & Zahavi, 2007). With the exception of 
certain sub-personal processes, cognition in EASC is conceived of as a conscious, 
 at University of Birmingham on May 18, 2011tap.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Larkin et al. 3
intersubjective process (Gallagher & Varela, 2001) of sense-making (Thompson, 2004). 
It has been argued (Wilson, 2002) that this process is to be understood as: situated (i.e., 
context-sensitive); temporal (i.e., varying according to time available); distributed (i.e., 
persons “off-load” certain cognitive work onto the environment, and thus the environ-
ment co-constitutes the cognitive system); engaged in the world, and thus action-orientated 
(i.e., intentional in the phenomenological sense); and embodied (i.e., at the very least, the 
body defines our perceptual involvement in the world). 
The meaning and experience of back pain, for example, will vary across situations, 
over time, and depending upon what the sufferer is attempting to do, and with whom. It 
is notable, for example, that chronic pain is frequently understood by sufferers to have a 
“corrosive” effect upon the embodied self. Thus, pain is intersubjectively embedded in 
both the physical and psychosocial aspects of our world, because its most damaging 
consequences for sufferers fall into this domain. This is illustrated by participants in the 
third author’s pain studies (Osborn & Smith, 1998, 2006; J.A. Smith & Osborn, 2007 ). 
The sufferer’s intentional relationship to both the objects and the people in the world is 
transformed and distorted through chronic pain:
It’s so bad it takes over my body, it takes over my mind, it makes me short-tempered you know, 
talking about the pain I’ve got, it makes me a pain, it’s that feeling of knowing that I must be a 
pain to others. I’m a bother. On a daily basis it’s destroying me, it’s stopping the pleasure of my 
life. (Participant from Osborn & Smith, 1998, p. 76)
Phenomenology and psychology have a long and often interdependent history. From 
the perspective of psychology, this history often begins with the work of the “Dutch 
School”—active in Utrecht during the 1950s, and strong advocates for the contribution 
which could be made to psychology by a Husserlian focus on experience. The fortunes 
of this group, and their work, were mixed (see Van Hezewijk & Stam, 2008), but through 
their relationships with the psychologists at Duquesne University in the United States, 
they have had lasting impact on psychology. Duquesne remains an internationally recog-
nized centre for a form of descriptive, empirical phenomenology (Giorgi, 2000) which 
has clearly been influenced by the Dutch School. In other respects, however, their con-
tribution to phenomenology’s place in psychology has been more equivocal. The group 
and their work were perceived by some as “elitist” and subjective (Van Hezewijk & 
Stam, 2008), and their influence in European psychology has long since declined. Given 
our aims here, it is interesting to comment briefly on Van Hezewijk and Stam’s retrospec-
tive overview of the widely dispersed published work of one of the Dutch School’s key 
players, Johannes Linschoten. Linschoten died young, in 1964, but his work demon-
strated an integrative instinct which appears to anticipate the project of EASC:
Linschoten saw experiments that were designed well and that accounted for what the participant 
would experience as a participant in the experimental setup, as legitimate and informative ways 
of focusing on and analyzing the true nature of our experience as a fundamental element of life. 
(Van Hezewijk & Stam, 2008, p. 204)
Such phenomenological emphases have traditionally been marginalized by mainstream 
cognitive psychology. For EASC, however, the insights of phenomenological philosophy 
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(notably those of Husserl, but also Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and others) have been at 
least as significant as those from the analytic philosophy (e.g., Ryle, Searle, Dennett) 
which presided over the preceding phases of cognitive science. Meaning is thus of funda-
mental importance here, because for phenomenologists, consciousness “makes possible 
the world as such, not in the sense that it makes possible the existence of the world, but in 
the sense that it makes possible a significant world” (Drummond, 2007, p. 61).
Contributions to EASC have so far tended to originate from two main approaches to 
knowledge construction: phenomenological philosophy and experimental science. In 
this paper, we wish to point out that, given the epistemological-ontological underpin-
nings of EASC, a wider range of potential connections with other approaches (to psy-
chology, cognition, and phenomenology) has been opened up, many of which have yet to 
be explored (but see Hurlburt & Akhtar, 2006, and also Petitmengin, 2006, for some 
interesting developments in “hybrid” methods). From our perspective, it is striking that 
the new model of cognitive science is one which shares certain underlying assumptions 
with a number of experiential-, embodiment-, and context-focused approaches from 
qualitative and critical psychology (see, e.g., Nightingale & Cromby, 1999). While vari-
ous philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists have been developing their critique of 
the dualist, acontextual, and disembodied limitations of “standard” cognitive science, a 
parallel network of qualitative and critical psychologists have been articulating their own 
case about certain similar limitations of the social constructionist paradigm, which has 
dominated qualitative and critical psychology for the last quarter-century:
Discourse theory seems to leave little space for embodied subjectivity, for the body as body. 
Instead, the body is, on the one hand, a metaphor, trope or symbol and, on the other hand, a 
surface for the inscription of social forces, experience, discourse. We need to go beyond this 
abraded, fleshless, ephemeral person to a view of the subject prey to physiological, anatomical 
and hormonal influences which act back upon the subjectivity they support, and also—through 
feedback generated within the brain/body system—may enter into the very core of subjectivity 
and agency. (Cromby, 2002, para. 9)
From within these approaches, a well-established strand of phenomenological and 
experiential psychology (see, e.g., Giorgi, 2000; Langdridge, 2006) appears to have 
overlooked, and been overlooked by, the rapid developments in EASC. This strand 
includes—but also exceeds—the influences of the Dutch School, incorporating 
approaches to psychology which are influenced not only by Husserl, but also by 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Ricoeur. In particular, there is one approach to qualita-
tive, phenomenological psychology, with a stated interest in cognition, which we will 
discuss in more depth. This is interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA; see J.A. 
Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009). IPA offers an established, systematic, and phenomeno-
logically focused approach, which is committed to understanding the first-person per-
spective from the third-person position, so far as is possible, through intersubjective 
inquiry and analysis. It is therefore committed to situating personal meaning in context. 
Largely in contrast to the Dutch School (Van Hezewijk & Stam, 2008), IPA draws on the 
hermeneutic phenomenology of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (J.A. Smith et al., 2009), 
to view the personal and social as mutually constitutive. This is captured in the contrac-
tions being-in-the-world and person-in-context, which are typically preferred over the 
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individual. Consequently, the “findings” of IPA studies should be very clearly situated in 
the cultural and historical context of their production.1 IPA is also committed to the use 
of verbatim transcript data. Its use of such data as a form of evidence, and its close atten-
tion to the functions of language, are another contrast with the more introspective and 
literary analyses of the Dutch School (see, e.g., Kockelmans, 1987). IPA is especially 
relevant to EASC, because of its willingness to “speak to” matters of cognition from a 
phenomenological perspective. This has marked IPA as distinctive within the prevailing 
social constructionist milieu of qualitative psychology (see, e.g., Langdridge, 2006; 
Willig, 2001), and identifies it as a particularly appealing potential contributor in the 
development of EASC.
Key ideas from phenomenology and hermeneutics, 
and their significance for EASC
Before we further develop our argument about the utility of IPA for EASC, it is helpful 
to outline some of the general influences of phenomenological philosophy upon the 
“new cognition.” Phenomenology is itself a “movement” which accommodates a range 
of distinctions and differences. Indeed, Glendinning (2007) prefers not to characterize it 
as a single movement at all, but as something more akin to a conversation. From this 
point of view, there are certain recurrent topics and concerns for the speakers in this 
conversation, and there is some agreement upon certain principles, or on the nature of 
certain problems—but it is inaccurate to represent the conversation as if it were, say, a 
unified theory, or some form of manifesto. Thus, we discuss briefly the development of 
this “conversation,” and identify some of its recurring topics and concerns. 
Transcendental phenomenology
The earlier phase of phenomenology, defined most clearly through the work of Husserl, 
is sometimes described as “transcendental phenomenology.” Moran (2000) defines phe-
nomenology as a form of philosophy “which emphasizes the attempt to get to the truth 
of matters, to describe phenomena, in the broadest sense as whatever appears in the 
manner in which it appears, that is as it manifests itself to consciousness, to the experi-
ence” (p. 4). This is certainly true of Husserl, who famously urged us, “Back to the 
things themselves!” (Husserl, 1913/1982, p. 35). By this, he meant that the phenomena 
under investigation should be studied free of all prior supposition and assumption (to be 
examined as they appear, are made manifest—as themselves only).
For Husserl, this was achieved through “phenomenological reduction.” “Reduction” 
here is not a reducing down, but a leading back—to the phenomena (the technique is 
also known by other names, including epoché, and bracketing—see Drummond, 
2007). This reduction involves the examination and then suspension of all supposi-
tions about the phenomenon under investigation, and, indeed, about the world. Husserl 
suggested that our natural attitude to the world is founded upon numerous assump-
tions, and that while these may facilitate our everyday doing and being, they also 
obscure and distort proper understanding. Through bracketing we aim to suspend 
these assumptions and to transcend their “everyday” qualities. The process often continues 
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throughout phenomenological investigations, because many of our assumptions 
about the world will not be revealed to us until they meet with our observations of 
the phenomenon under investigation. For IPA, and many other qualitative approaches 
(see, e.g., Finlay & Gough, 2003), the phenomenological reduction has been problema-
tized (see below) but has nevertheless influenced an important commitment to open-
mindedness and researcher reflexivity.
Bracketing is thus one defining characteristic of transcendental phenomenology, 
and it is also connected to another of Husserl’s principal methods: the “eidetic reduc-
tion.” This is a process of imaginative variation: we identify and examine each aspect 
of our chosen phenomenon to ascertain which of those aspects are essential. We ask, 
“What if . . . ?”—and then imagine alternative ways of seeing a phenomenon—by 
varying or removing certain characteristics. This is an ongoing process, rather than a 
single step. A process of comparison and corroboration follows, with the aim of estab-
lishing the invariant aspects of the description. The final descriptive account, indica-
tive of a successful Husserlian study, will be abstracted from these processes. This 
should transcend any particulars of situation and individual variation—the account 
should describe the universal features of “what something is like.” The various aspects 
of these reductions reflect many of the analytical processes which are common to most 
approaches to qualitative psychology: the detailed identification of key features, the 
processes of comparison and pattern development.
Two common misconceptions should be noted here. Firstly, the phenomenological 
reduction has often been misrepresented as if it were a form of “closure” or “objectifica-
tion.” But to “bracket” one’s preconceptions is to suspend them, and allow them to be 
examined—not to eradicate them. In EASC studies there is sometimes an uneasy use of 
bracketing as if it were a means of “laundering” out subjectivity (to borrow an accusation 
levelled at Dennett elsewhere). This is not consistent with bracketing as it is usually 
understood in phenomenological psychology (see, e.g., Giorgi, 2000). Certainly, within 
qualitative psychology, bracketing sits squarely within a broader tradition which ques-
tions the status of “facts” as objective constants in the social sciences (see, e.g., Gergen, 
1973), and which typically sets out to reveal and reflect upon values (rather than to 
exclude them through experimental and statistical closure—see M.J. Smith, 1998). 
Bracketing is more about open-mindedness than it is about doubt (see, e.g., Glendinning, 
2007), and can be seen as a means of exposing and engaging with one’s own presupposi-
tions (see, e.g., Finlay, 2002).
Secondly, Husserl has often been unfairly accused of having established the idea that 
phenomenology is simply an introspective study of “inner” experience. This is now 
widely acknowledged as a misreading (see, e.g., Drummond, 2007; Gallagher & Zahavi, 
2007), because Husserl places intentionality at the centre of his analyses. This is a key 
concept in phenomenology, where it does not refer, in the commonplace sense, to a per-
son’s intentions (what they “plan to do” for example.) The term originates from the Latin 
intendere, meaning “to stretch forth” (Spinelli, 2000, p. 11). It speaks of our relationship 
with the world and how as conscious beings our experience is always of something, in its 
appearing in the world, and specifically for us, as uniquely embodied and situated per-
sons. The intentional act is hence comprised of a relationship between that which is 
experienced, and the manner in which it is experienced (Husserl, 1913/1931). Thus, 
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phenomenologists note that human consciousness has qualities of mine-ness (I do not 
have to ask myself, “Who is experiencing these things?”—it is self-evidently me) and 
about-ness (I am sad about something; I am angry at someone). This sense of conscious-
ness as perspectival and embodied, captured in the intentionality of our “directness-at-
objects,” has the potential to transcend the usual dualisms of mind–body and 
subject–object. From the point of view of cognitive science—and key to the develop-
ment of EASC—we have a model of consciousness which does not rely principally on 
inner representations of an independent reality. Indeed, it is more accurate to describe it 
as a model of being-in-the-world, or relatedness-to-the-world.
Hermeneutic and existential phenomenology
The later phase of phenomenology is often described as “hermeneutic phenomenology,” 
because it develops through ideas taken from that tradition where “understanding is 
always from a perspective, always a matter of interpretation” (McLeod, 2000, p. 56). The 
key participants in the conversation (for us, here) are Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. 
In his work, Heidegger retained “intentional directedness as essential to human 
activity, but [denied] that intentionality is mental” (Dreyfus, 1995, pp. 50–51). He 
draws our focus away from “private thought,” and the search for its location. Heidegger’s 
view of the person as always and indelibly a “person-in-context,” and the phenomeno-
logical concept of intersubjectivity, are both central here. From Heidegger’s perspec-
tive, we are mistaken if we believe that we can occasionally choose to take up a 
relationship with the various somatic and semantic objects that make up our world—to 
move outwards, from some inner world—because relatedness is a fundamental part of 
our constitution (Heidegger, 1927/1962). 
From this perspective, and that of IPA, the personal and the social are elided, just as 
the subject and object are. The “social world” is more than “mere” context; it is the con-
stituent ground of personhood, and a prerequisite for human being. At the same time, the 
“personal” aspect of our existence is unique, and refers to the related, perspectival, and 
meaningful nature of our engagement and involvement in that lived, social world (else-
where, we have referred to this as “positionality”—see Palmer, Larkin, de Visser, & 
Fadden, 2010). The personal and social are drawn together by the essentially related 
nature of Being-in-the-world; although, of course, IPA does typically engage with par-
ticipants’ accounts under circumstances when the personal is made especially salient. 
Our use of the word “context” is intended to evoke the worldly circumstances in which 
meanings are made.
Intersubjectivity, then, is the concept which aims to describe this relatedness—and to 
account for our ability to communicate with, and make sense of, each other. It is the 
emergent property of our engagement in the world, and, as such, AI theorists (e.g., 
Anderson, 2003) and philosophers of mind (e.g., Gallagher, 2007) use the concept to 
offer models of cognition which rely less on representation, simulation, and analogy, and 
more on an interactive, dynamic, situation-relevant, and altogether more “worldly” 
understanding. The world is emphasized because it affords the embodied, intentional 
actor a range of physically grounded (what is possible) and intersubjectively grounded 
(what is meaningful) options. 
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Returning to the Dutch School, Buytendijk’s (1943/1961) classic phenomenological 
study of pain offers a good starting point: “Genuine pain afflicts us and severs the psy-
chological unity of our person; our personal existence is unmolested, but it is thrown 
back on itself and subjected to the destruction of all meaningful associations” (p. 134). 
Consider how even familiar environments are transformed for us through the debilitat-
ing experience of a severe and chronic back pain. Furniture and other objects present 
themselves as newly complex obstacles. Calls to communication (answering the door, 
or reaching for the phone) suddenly require excruciating care. The world must be rene-
gotiated through these affordances. The range of “what is possible” has shrunk, and the 
meaning of those possibilities has changed, and the self with them. For sufferers, pain 
is embodied, but it is not simply “contained” by the physical body; it is manifest in the 
person’s diminished relationship to the world: 
I don’t go out, I don’t answer the phone. I live at the back of the house and I dread it when the 
postman comes. (Participant from J.A. Smith & Osborn, 2007, p. 528)
The situated, everyday nature of such claims, which Husserl aimed to transcend, was for 
Heidegger not only inescapable, but also crucial for understanding our being-in-the-
world. We are always-already “out there” in a meaningful world of this kind, and, indeed, 
meaningfulness is a fundamental part of its constitution. Thus, we can only be properly 
understood as a function of our various involvements with the world, and the world in 
turn can only be properly disclosed and understood as a function of our involvements 
with it. This represents a fundamental rejection of the Cartesian divide between subject 
and object. It is captured by Heidegger’s characterization of human-being in terms of 
Dasein, by which he implies that our very nature is to be there—always somewhere, 
always located, and always amidst and involved with some kind of meaningful context. 
This is a hermeneutic phenomenology, therefore, because it emphasizes that sense-making 
is always situated, and it is existential because it is grounded—there—in the lived world. 
This in turn problematizes the possibility of any form of full and successful phenomeno-
logical reduction—observations, because situated, are always interpretations:
There is no pure third-person perspective, just as there is no view from nowhere. . . . This is not 
to say that there is no third-person perspective, but merely that such a perspective is exactly a 
perspective from somewhere . . . it emerges out of the encounter between at least two first-
person perspectives; that is, it involves intersubjectivity. (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2007, p. 40)
Merleau-Ponty took a similar view, placing his “focus between the person and the world, 
rather than within either” (Butt, 1999, p. 135). He agreed that it is highly doubtful that 
the phenomenological reduction can ever be fully achieved, because we are always being 
brought back into our own situatedness (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962). Most important for 
Merleau-Ponty, however, is the idea that situatedness is also very notably embodied. For 
EASC, this is crucial. Merleau-Ponty argues that the body shapes the fundamental char-
acter of our knowing about the world. We are, first of all, body-subjects. Practical activi-
ties and relations—the physical and perceptual affordances of the body-in-the-world—are 
thus more significant than abstract or logical ones (Anderson, 2003). 
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Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty all distinguished between some form of 
first-person “lived body” (so often effaced and invisible to us, unless it becomes present 
through some challenge, limitation, meditation, or dysfunction) from the third-person 
“objective body” (an awareness of one’s body as it may be perceived by another). 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the body extends further, because it offers an embodied 
sense of intentionality. For example, in the act of pointing, or dancing, our sense of 
embodiment seems to exceed the physical limits of the body: “Consciousness projects 
itself into the physical world and has a body, as it projects itself into a cultural world and 
has its habits” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 137). As with Heidegger’s transformation 
of intersubjectivity, so Merleau-Ponty’s development of embodiment again shifted phe-
nomenology further away from the concept of an “inner” subject (Ihde, 2003). On this 
reading, embodiment and intersubjectivity overlap at the interface with culture. Culture 
here brings with it the material-discursive correlates of our embodiment: gender, ethnic-
ity, ability, health, and illness. These have an impact upon the body as lived and the 
body as perceived, and upon the affordances which the world offers us. On the one 
hand, as Ihde (2003) suggests, the lived body is “situated” within, and “permeated” by, 
the culturally constructed body. On the other, the lived experience of being a body-in-
the-world can never be entirely captured or absorbed by cultural constructs—the inten-
tional quality and meaning of “mineness” and “aboutness” are always personal to the 
body-subject. For Gallagher and Zahavi (2007), this is crucial to understanding how we 
make sense of one another:
When presented with behaviour, it is not as if we are faced with mere bodily processes that 
can then be interpreted any way one likes. Rather, it is more like being confronted with a 
language. Even a foreign and incomprehensible language is perceived as meaningful, and not 
simply physical noise. When you see somebody use a hammer, or feed a child, or clean a 
table, you don’t have a problem understanding what is going on. You don’t necessarily 
understand every aspect of the action, but it is immediately given as a meaningful action (in 
a shared world). (p. 148)
Intersubjectivity, embodiment, and the world
On the whole, contributors to EASC have steered clear of writing about the social or 
cultural context of experience—but this is an important part of the shared, lived world in 
which the body is situated and represented, and in which consciousness and cognition are 
involved in making meaning. Given that, historically, empirical psychology has tended 
to treat matters of context and meaning as unnecessary or undesirable variables, matters 
for exclusion through design (e.g., Van Langenhove, 1995), this suggests that the rela-
tionship between phenomenological and cognitive aspects of EASC is still not yet mature 
and reciprocal. 
EASC has made most use of phenomenological ideas at a relatively “contained” 
level of psychological inference—for postulating the relationship between two per-
sons (Gallagher, 2005), or modelling the subject exploring the physical world 
(Anderson, 2003). But the phenomenological concepts of embodiment and intersub-
jectivity also speak to a wider contextual level of analysis. When Heidegger writes of 
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Dasein as being thrown into the world, he gives us a metaphor for understanding our 
relationship with cultural objects and resources. The physical, social, and cultural 
world has a factical existence which precedes us, and which limits what we can do, 
be, and claim. Heidegger’s world is a “with-world” (Mitsein—being-with—is a fur-
ther characteristic of Dasein). When Heidegger famously writes of language as “the 
house of Being,” he further points out that our interpretations of experience are always 
shaped by—limited and enabled by—language. Our understandings of our experi-
ences are thus woven from the fabric of our many and varied relationships with oth-
ers, in the context of a world which is shaped by language and culture at least as much 
as it is by bodies and objects. Accounts of enculturation and intersubjectivity which 
are broadly consistent with these positions can be drawn from developmental psy-
chology (Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001) and cultural psychology (Cole, 1996; Shweder, 
2003). Conversely, a much stronger form of this claim arises in discursive psychology 
(DP), where the socially constituted nature of personhood (to the exclusion of a per-
sonal or worldly dimension) is often employed as a central, delimiting tenet (see 
Cromby, 2002; Hammersely, 2003). IPA has developed out of a critique of some of the 
limitations of discursive psychology (e.g., Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006; J.A. Smith, 
1996; J.A. Smith et al., 2009). It differs from DP because of its explicit interest in 
understanding participants’ accounts under circumstances when the personal is made 
especially salient. We might call this a “post-constructionist” phenomenological psy-
chology because it recognizes the value of the constructionist view, whilst wanting to 
affirm and reinstate experiential meaning-making as a useful mode of understanding 
in psychology.
Understanding enculturation means understanding how we become, and how we 
sustain ourselves as, successful participants in culture. Gallagher (e.g., 2005; 2007) has 
been concerned with the former here, drawing on developmental psychology’s accounts 
of the emergence of “primary intersubjectivity” to underpin his “interactive theory of 
mind.” But the latter part is equally important, and has been granted less attention in 
EASC. How does intersubjectivity work once we are “up and running,” so to speak? To 
answer this, we need an account of how both the embodied-situated and intersubjective-
relational qualities of human understanding come together, from the perspective of a 
given person, in a given context. 
Qualitative methods of inquiry, like IPA, are especially effective when it comes to 
offering insights at this level. In order to make sense of people’s experiences of pain, for 
example, we also need to consider the cultural imperatives which shape our informants’ 
understandings of personhood, and in this context to understand pain as a phenomenon 
abrading the body, the self, and relations with others. When one asks, “What does it 
mean to be a good person?” (see our section below “The wordliness of the body-
subject: The case of chronic pain”), it may not immediately appear that this a question 
about “pain.” However, it will be evident that this is a question about the world, and that 
our answers will vary according to cultural context. The answer to this question (and 
others like it) will be the ground against which the lived experience of pain acquires its 
meaning, and, consequently, EASC must be cautious in its search for invariant or uni-
versal phenomenal structures. Hermeneutic phenomenology shows us how even some-
thing so apparently and fundamentally embodied as pain can be a relational and 
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contextual phenomenon. In this example, some of these existential consequences of 
pain are clearly illustrated:
It’s not who I am, it’s just who I am, if you know what I mean. It’s not really me, I get like that 
and I know like, “You’re being mean now,” but I can’t help it. It’s the pain, it’s me, but it is me, 
me doing it but not me—do you understand what I’m saying? If I was to describe myself like 
you said, I’m a nice person, but then I’m not, am I? And there’s other stuff, stuff I haven’t told 
you. If you knew, you’d be disgusted—I just get so hateful. . . . I know your gonna say it’s all 
me, but I can’t help it even though I don’t like it. It’s the mean me, my mean head all sour and 
horrible, I can’t cope with that bit, I cope with the pain better. (Participant in J.A. Smith & 
Osborn, 2007, p. 522)
The participant here describes a psychosocial battle for identity itself, an attempt to 
retain the old “nice” self against the onslaught of the new “mean” self. The self “as it 
appears to our flesh-and-bone selves” (Varela, 1999, p. 267) is made meaningful for this 
participant within a given context—the context of relationships with others. She describes 
her struggle to preserve an acceptable self as more challenging even than the pain which 
threatens it. 
Phenomenological methods and EASC
Certain ideas from phenomenology have been taken up by both EASC and qualitative 
psychologists for the purposes of working with empirical data. The matter of their com-
mon interests and boundaries is complex and disputed (e.g., Gallagher & Zahavi, 2007; 
Thompson, 2004). This is beyond the scope of our argument here, and we merely note 
that the capacity of insights from either approach to “invalidate” those from the other is 
extensive. This will be a problem for EASC unless it matures into a well-balanced hybrid, 
which can accommodate and resolve these conflicts through a shared epistemological 
framework. Our efforts here are directed towards that end. 
Various authors working in, or speaking to, the EASC strand (e.g., Dennett, 2003; 
Gallagher & Sørensen, 2006; Gallagher & Varela, 2001; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2007; 
Varela, 1996) have attempted to outline a methodological place for phenomenology in 
the empirical study of cognition. Despite an awareness in these discussions that phe-
nomenology ought not to be the “handmaiden” to cognitive science, the hybrid forms 
produced have nevertheless tended to emphasize the primacy of empiricist methods. In 
a sense, this is inevitable—the task in hand has been characterized as the need to “natu-
ralize” phenomenology (usually meaning, “orient towards a more legitimate natural 
science model”). As Gallagher and Varela (2001) concede, phenomenology is, “by 
definition, non-naturalistic.” However, they go on to argue that, “everything, however, 
depends on what one means by naturalization” (p. 19), indicating that a range of posi-
tions may be possible. We would suggest that a certain degree of plurality may even be 
helpful here. 
As it stands, EASC has at least three well-developed methodological options already. 
These have been discussed in some depth elsewhere, and so we will not cover them in 
any detail here (see Gallagher & Varela, 2001; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2007). In brief, 
firstly, both Marbach (1993) and Roy et al. (1999) have advocated different degrees of 
 at University of Birmingham on May 18, 2011tap.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
12  Theory & Psychology 
formalization (translation of highly structured Husserlian phenomenological analyses 
into a formal or mathematical notation devised for the case). From a hermeneutic per-
spective, this is clearly problematic—phenomenological accounts will refer to situated 
meanings, but formal logic of this sort requires relation and causation. Secondly, Varela 
(1996) famously championed a neurophenomenology. This follows a Husserlian model, 
and applies it in experimental settings, but the premise is that both experimenter and 
participants are trained in aspects of the phenomenological method. An initial, phenom-
enological analysis of the participants’ experience of an experimental task is used to 
develop an experimental protocol which is then tested empirically (e.g., Lutz, Lachaux, 
Martiniere, & Varela, 2002). Finally, Gallagher (2003) has advocated a third option—the 
phenomenologically informed experimental design. He calls this front-loaded phenom-
enology. Here, studies test a premise which follows from a phenomenological descrip-
tion (e.g., Farrer & Frith, 2002). 
These hybrid methods which might be adopted in EASC require a relatively struc-
tured approach to the collection and organization of phenomenological material, and in 
design terms they effectively treat the empiricist methods as a trump card, which explains, 
validates, or “cashes out” (Gallagher’s term) the phenomenological material. However, 
the conceptual underpinning of EASC suggests that the role of phenomenology should 
be more than simply a “convenient stop on our way to a real explanation,” and indeed, 
“an active participant in its own right” (Varela, 1996, p. 344).
These hybrid forms of phenomenologically based investigation, and the informa-
tion developed from them, are already paving the way for phenomenology to speak to 
empirical accounts, and to inform their development. They offer innovative ways for 
scientists to engage with phenomenology, and to generate knowledge which begins to 
have some degree of in-built “phenomenological validity.” However, much of the 
research-focused writing about EASC implicitly presumes the primacy of a scientis-
tic model over any account evolved from phenomenology. To us, this looks like a 
missed opportunity. 
What is missing here is what Varela and Thompson have referred to as “putting human 
life back in” to the study of mind. Reflecting on the impact of their landmark text (Varela, 
Thompson, & Rosca, 1991), Thompson notes that, 
although the ideas about embodied cognition have been widely acknowledged and 
assimilated by the field, the book’s central theme has yet to be absorbed. . . . That theme is 
the need for back-and-forth circulation between scientific research on the mind and 
disciplined phenomenologists of lived experience. (Thompson, 2004, p. 382)
Despite the strong influence of hermeneutic phenomenology on the conceptual under-
pinnings of EASC, then, the principal influence on its research appears to be a rather 
narrow “version” of Husserl. As Gallagher and Zahavi (2007) point out, Husserl was no 
more amenable to any sort of “cashing out” or reducing down to empirical accounts than 
were any of those who followed him in the phenomenological conversation. Nevertheless, 
it would appear that the concept of the person as a situated, embodied meaning-maker is 
not yet speaking through empirical research in this area, despite its clear presence in the 
conceptual base of EASC.
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We would strongly recommend the development of a richer and broader dialogue to 
explore the value of both positions as “mutually constraining and enriching approaches 
to the study of the mind” (Van Gelder, 1999, p. 246), rather than as inequitable partners. 
To this end, we show a different form of phenomenological work—a qualitative, herme-
neutic variation—which should be an important part of this dialogue. Approaches like 
IPA have the potential to capture some of the more situated and meaningful aspects of 
human Being—to put the human back in, so to speak. 
Two significant consequences of such a move can be anticipated. Firstly, the qualita-
tive, contextual, and less structured nature of such work will lend itself less readily to any 
sort of cashing out by empirical methods. Secondly, the emphasis on capturing phenom-
ena as they are understood by persons-in-context may well problematize the evidential 
status of some claims made from the existing cognitive-empirical approaches to EASC. 
In the short term, these may be challenging. In the longer term, both of these outcomes 
will lead to the development of a more coherent, balanced, and resilient EASC. 
Embodied active situated cognition (EASC) and 
interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA)
IPA aims to understand how people make sense of events, relationships, and processes 
in the context of their particular lifeworlds. Whatever phenomenon is being studied, 
the aim is to understand “what it is like to be experiencing this, for this particular 
person, in this context.” Often IPA researchers will use the terms Being-in-the-world 
and lived experience to express this. “Being-in-the-world” captures the sense of an 
intentional, embodied, and situated person; and “lived experience” is intended to 
encompass the interpreted and meaningfully lived aspect of our being-in-the-world. 
In other words, IPA aims to understand the lived experience of a conscious, situated, 
embodied being-in-the-world, where “the world” is understood through a respon-
dent’s involvement in it. 
The focus on lived experience means that IPA researchers approach the phenome-
non under investigation from the research participant’s perspective. Detailed and rich 
data are taken from small numbers of cases, in order that they can be adequately situ-
ated, described, and interpreted. Typically, these take the form of various verbatim, 
first-person accounts (interviews, diaries, written accounts—following a range and 
degree of structures). Transcripts are then subjected to systematic processes of reflec-
tion, identification, description, clarification, interpretation, and contextualization 
(e.g., Eatough & Smith, 2007; Larkin et al., 2006). These processes reflect various 
aspects of the standard phenomenological method as described above, within a her-
meneutic framework.
IPA has often been positioned as distinctive, but also problematic, amongst qualitative 
approaches (e.g., Langdridge, 2006; Willig, 2001) because of its stated interest in cogni-
tion (e.g., J.A. Smith, 1996; J.A. Smith & Osborn, 2003). This may be based on a mis-
conception (i.e., that IPA researchers claim to be investigating cognition directly, or, 
indeed, simply to be “doing” cognitive psychology). Yet, the concerns of hermeneutic 
phenomenological psychology and standard cognitive psychology are distinctive (they 
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are interested in acquiring different sorts of knowledge, in making different levels of 
claims, and they employ different definitions of the terrain) but they do overlap at certain 
key points. The most obvious of these (and the most relevant for EASC) is meaning-
making. People make meaning. For IPA researchers, the sense-making activities of peo-
ple (in conversations, diaries, group discussions, or other forms) are the basis for learning 
about their relationship to the world. This allows us to develop an account of what an 
identifiable experience (an event, process, or relationship, etc.) has come to mean for 
particular people, within certain contexts. At the level of interpretation and discussion, 
this phenomenological account can then be related back to existing theoretical accounts 
from psychology. 
In summary, then, we want to argue that IPA (and indeed other related approaches 
from phenomenological psychology) can and should contribute to the development of 
EASC. It can contribute to the inductive development of systematic accounts of common 
structures of meaning, but it problematizes any claims that these are invariant structures, 
in the Husserlian sense, because, for IPA researchers, experience is always already situ-
ated (in historical, linguistic, cultural, and embodied contexts). The attention which IPA 
consequently grants to the personal and contextual worldliness of the body-subject can 
be an important aspect of EASC, not least because it may counterbalance some of the 
more “laundered” and abstracted accounts of experience which are produced to some 
extent by existing methods in EASC. That is, it offers EASC an opportunity to put human 
life “back in.”
The wordliness of the body-subject: The case of chronic pain
In this final section, we offer a more “data-driven” illustration of the argument which we 
have developed so far.
Embodiment is often effaced in favour of the intentional act. In the absence of any excep-
tional or unexpected demands upon the body, we often do not notice our bodies in our 
involvement in the world. When we reach for something from the refrigerator, for exam-
ple, we may be thinking about the preparation of an ingredient for a recipe, anticipating 
the taste of a quick snack, experiencing pangs of hunger in our stomach, or concentrating 
on the extrication of the item from a precariously overstocked shelf. Each of these, we 
may think, reminds us that we are embodied subjects. And yet, in the sense of our imme-
diate interaction with the item in the refrigerator, only in the last of these instances will 
we have any awareness of the shape and actions of our hand as we reach for the item—
because only in this instance does the environment place an exceptional demand upon 
our dexterity. 
Similarly, the body may also be effaced by the presence of other, more explicitly 
meaningful claims upon us. Thus, we may not be particularly aware of our bodies as we 
sit at a desk, writing an academic paper—at least until we get stuck, and find that the 
refrigerator beckons.
The body can very be quickly be made critical, however. Becoming aware of our-
selves as a body-subject, through some critical social judgement, or physical illness, for 
example (“something gone awry”), can be a very troubling experience. As Buytendijk 
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(1943/1961) has it: “The essence of pain lies in the subject’s being separated from the 
body yet at the same time chained to it” (p. 151).
Chronic benign pain is a case in point. It is any pain that has persisted for longer 
than 6 months and is not related to an ongoing peripheral disease process. Here we 
present a few further data extracts from a series of studies which began as an explor-
atory and descriptive study of the experience of living with chronic pain (Osborn & 
Smith, 1998), and developed over time into an analysis of the participants’ struggle to 
retain any sense of a socially valued or coherent self whilst in pain (J.A. Smith & 
Osborn, 2007). 
The participants’ accounts were rich and varied, but strong shared themes described a 
chronic sense of confusion, social withdrawal, and a worry that they were being persis-
tently disbelieved. These themes seemed to converge when participants described their 
concerns for their own identity. The extraordinary personal salience of the pain, and its 
implications for the body-subject, are evident. This was most powerfully evoked in a 
series of statements which elided pain with the self—for example, “I am a pain,” and “It 
makes me a pain.”
Furthermore, the accounts established pain as something that went beyond the sen-
sory or cognitive domains, situated within a significant affective and relational context. 
Pain was understood in the context of a relational self, which encompassed the body, 
sensory experience, and the social connectedness of the person:
I’d love that [being alone on a desert island] . . . but to be away from people and not have to be 
something else you’re not, that would be bliss. . . . I’d still be a miserable old git [i.e., still have 
pain] but it wouldn’t matter, it’s only when other people come around that it matters. If you can 
just be yourself it doesn’t matter what you do, I wouldn’t have to put on that front so it’d be 
easier. (Participant from Osborn & Smith, 2006, unpublished data)
While personal and social relationships were made painfully salient, there was sometimes 
a sense of detachment from the physical “site” of the pain. The internal workings of the 
body appeared to be absent from the self, and the body in pain was excluded from the self:
I never thought about my body before, I just abused it, I suppose. Now I feel it and bits of it feel 
really weird, as if they’re not part of me any more . . . the numb bits and down the leg where it 
hurts and I can’t move it like I could, they’re somehow separate now. (Participant from Osborn 
& Smith, 2006, p. 219)
A body which may once have been easily effaced (“I never thought about my body 
before”) was now both the site of a sort of exaggerated self-awareness, and yet simulta-
neously disembodied:
Now it’s me with this bit that doesn’t fit, but it’s/ but it’s not me, it’s a part of my body which 
doesn’t belong. . . . Well it feels different, you know about it, it tingles and burns sometimes, 
back and down my legs so you can isolate it, you can tell the part that doesn’t belong to you, 
like it’s been infiltrated or something like at the dentist, not just the pain but all the tingling 
and numbness and the fact it doesn’t work as well. I can lift my arm, no problem, but you 
have to work harder to get the legs to do stuff, you have to make them. . . . Yeah, kind of 
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because they’re not me so I have to kind of make them. (Participant from Osborn & Smith, 
2006, p. 219)
It is striking that the descriptions of pain in these accounts offer much more than accounts 
of physical sensations and damage. They capture a sense of the intersubjectively cor-
roded self. Rich accounts of the struggle to retain some kind of a contemporary, valued 
sense of self emerged. This was particularly evident in participants’ attempts to distance 
themselves from experiences of self-disgust and shame:
If I can’t be the image that I think I am then I’m in trouble . . . but it’s not me, that’s not me, I’m 
not like that.
It’s not me but I suppose it is and if you didn’t know me you’d think I was a miserable cow, so 
maybe I was a nice person and now I’m a cow.
I think things which are mean, things which I’d never tell anyone and I’ll not tell you so don’t 
ask. (Participants from Osborn & Smith, 2006, unpublished data)
There is a sense that the expected social and cultural frame for making sense of person-
hood, and for embodied experience, has been disrupted. In particular, ideas about the 
coherence and consistency of one’s character appeared to be overturned by the experi-
ence of chronic pain (“I was a nice person and now I’m a cow”). In pain, participants’ 
relationships to the world were transformed. 
The implications for an account of consciousness, cognition, and emotion as 
embodied, active, and situated are complex. The above examples illustrate the debili-
tating impact of chronic pain, not only through capturing something of the personal 
and embodied distress of back pain, but also by illustrating the social, cultural, and 
moral context of disability. Our purpose here has been to demonstrate that these 
embodied and situated dimensions of pain are, firstly, important to any proper com-
prehension of our participants’ experience of chronic pain, and secondly, because 
embedded in meaning, accessible through the qualitative methods of interpretative 
phenomenological psychology. Thus, the sensory unpleasantness of the participants’ 
pain was accompanied by a social and moral unpleasantness, which was linked to 
feelings of humiliation, embarrassment, and shame. Chronic pain left them vulnerable 
to punishment, rejection, and condemnation, and thus emerged as a phenomenologi-
cally malignant condition.
Summary
We have described the confluence of two bodies of work—the developing model of 
embodied active situated cognition and its engagement with phenomenological philoso-
phy. We have argued that EASC has neglected (or been neglected by) an important body 
of work, in the field of qualitative phenomenological psychology. We have endeavoured 
to show that methods from phenomenological psychology (notably, IPA) can make a 
useful contribution to the development of EASC, not least in providing a hermeneutic 
counterpoint to the strong empiricist flavour of the emergent discipline. Through 
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reference to the sustained example of participants’ accounts of chronic pain, we have 
illustrated the importance of situating embodied personal experience in the context of 
meaning, relationships, and the lived world.
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Note
1. One of the challenges for researchers working primarily in the Husserlian tradition is the 
requirement to produce an abstracted account which transcends context. Linschoten’s (1953/1987) 
account of “sexual incarnation” is a telling example of how difficult this is. Fifty-six years’ 
worth of changes in sexual politics have transformed the text.
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